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LettersCourt ruling on EUcompanieswill vary de-
pending on their specific circumstances.
Companies that would have faced a
freedom to operate problem because of
hESC patents held by others may now
be more likely to start, or continue, hESC
research programs because the Court’s
ruling renders such patents unenforce-
able. Companies working on the ‘‘im-
provement’’ of hESC related-technolo-
gies, for instance, which would have
faced patent infringement litigation or
would have had to pay royalties, may
find themselves more incentivized to
performhESC research in theEU following
theCourt’s ruling. By contrast, companies
holding foundational hESC inventions
might be incentivized to work in jurisdic-
tions that offer patent protection for
hESC inventions (e.g., the USA).
Despite the Court ruling we believe that
sponsors of hESC-based therapies will
locate trials in Europe for a number of
reasons. Companies developing hESC
therapies will ultimately desire to sell their
products on the European market. The
EMA may require data from European
clinical trials before it approves of any
future hESC-derived therapy. Moreover,
recent studies suggest that over 50% of
products headed for FDA approval are in
clinical trials that involve foreign study
sites (Levinson, 2010).
Finally the possibility that some com-
panies could be attracted to Europe500 Cell Stem Cell 9, December 2, 2011 ª20because of this decision cannot be dis-
counted. Although the Court ruling does
not directly impact the patentability of
hESC inventions in the U.S., it will have
a ripple effect there. American companies
facing a freedom to operate problem
because of U.S. patents held by others
may now reconsider their business
plans. Moving their research operations
to Europe becomes a more attractive
option because the EU counterparts of
those patents are no longer enforceable.
These companies will balance the benefit
afforded by the new EU patent landscape
against the protection that the Hatch
Waxman Act provides for certain research
activities in the U.S. and the significant
costs of moving an already established
and ongoing research operation. A cost
differential that disfavors the U.S. as an
alternative to the EU may incentivize
companies to consider moving their trials
and preclinical efforts to places such as
India or China.
As Yogi Berra once said, ‘‘It’s tough to
make predictions, especially about the
future.’’ Everyone will need to wait and
see how various stakeholders in the
research community actually respond to
the Court’s ruling. Nevertheless, we are
confident that the reaction will be depen-
dent on many individual variables. As a
result, we expect that some of the
currently critical hESC researchanddevel-
opment in the EU will continue to flourish.11 Elsevier Inc.REFERENCES
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DOI 10.1016/j.stem.2011.11.007On October 18, 2011, the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) issued its
much anticipated and controversial deci-
sion in the case of Bru¨stle v. Greenpeace
(Court of Justice of the European Union,
2011). The Court ruled that inventions
involving human embryonic stem cells(hESCs) are unpatentable.While this deci-
sion is unhelpful for the field, its impact
may be more limited and nuanced than
others have suggested.
In brief, the case related to a patent filed
by Professor Oliver Bru¨stle in 1997 that
described and claimed the isolation andpurification of precursor cells generated
from hESCs. Greenpeace argued in pro-
ceedings launched initially in Germany in
2004 that this patent breached Article
6(2)(c) of the EU Biotechnology Directive,
which states that inventions involving the
‘‘use of human embryos for industrial or
Cell Stem Cell
Letterscommercial purposes’’ are unpatentable
in EU Member States (European Union,
1998). Greenpeace was partially success-
ful at the first instance, but eventually
Germany’s highest court stayed the
action and referred certain questions on
the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) to the
CJEU in November 2009. The questions
referred were complicated, but may
be condensed to the following: (1) are
inventions involving hESCs unpatentable
because the hESCs constitute an
‘‘embryo’’ and thus fall within the patent-
ability exclusion of Article 6(2)(c)? And (2)
are inventions involving hESCs for use in
scientific research also excluded from
patentability?
InMarch 2011, the Advocate General of
the CJEU, Yves Bots, produced an
opinion to assist the Court that concluded
that if a technical process for which
a patent is filed necessitates the prior
destruction of an embryo, then even if
the patent description does not contain
any reference to the use of embryos or
the source of the cells, the invention
must be excluded from patentability.
The Advocate General also stated
that the expression ‘‘embryo’’ required a
Community-wide interpretation to pre-
vent each Member State from deter-
mining the patentability of biotechnology
inventions using local definitions; some-
thing which Mr. Bots concluded would
be antithetical to the purpose of the
Directive. Because totipotent cells have
the capacity to develop into a complete
human body, the Advocate General
took the novel view that they represent
an embryo. Furthermore, according to
Mr. Bots, because totipotent cells give
way to blastocysts, a blastocyst is also an
embryo for the purposes of patentability.
The October 2011 decision of the CJEU
largely adopted this opinion. The Court
found that an invention is excluded from
patentability if the process requires either
the prior destruction of human embryos or
their prior use as base material, even if the
application does not refer to the use of
human embryos. Furthermore, the CJEU
concluded that scientific research entail-ing the use of human embryos cannot
access the protection of patent law.
This decision is an unwelcome devel-
opment for stem cell research, and it has
generated widespread criticism from the
scientific community, notably contrasted
with broadly held support among those
ideologically opposed to hESCs and
embryo research. However, the impact
of the judgment may be moderated for
a number of reasons. First, it will be virtu-
ally impossible for a regulator to approve
a generic (technically a biosimilar) stem
cell therapy. Such therapies will typically
be complex entities that would be chal-
lenging, if not impossible, to reproduce,
and preclinical and clinical trials would
be required to establish comparability. A
high barrier to entry for an hESC biosimilar
would offer greater regulatory protection
for hESC-derived inventions, arguably
liberating such therapies from the tyranny
of limited patent life.
Second, it is likely that many hESC
therapies will be eligible for orphan drug
designation. Therapies intended for the
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of a
life-threatening or chronically debilitating
condition affecting not more than 5 in
10,000 people ordinarily benefit from a
10-year period in which no European
regulator will accept another application
for a marketing authorization for the
same therapeutic indication in respect of
a similar product. Orphan drug designa-
tion can therefore deliver 10 years of
market exclusivity.
Third, it will still be possible to obtain
patents such as that filed by Professor
Bru¨stle in other jurisdictions (including
the U.S., China, and India). Furthermore,
other aspects of hESC therapies (such
as biomarkers) may still be patentable in
Europe. Inventors will inevitably continue
to seek ways to obtain patents notwith-
standing the decision.
Finally, it is uncertain what effect the
CJEU’s ruling will have on the approach
of the European Patent Office (EPO) to
hESC inventions. The sector has been
grappling with similar issues for some
time; opposition proceedings regardingCell Stem Cell 9,hESC lines came before the EPO over
a decade ago, and the patent office’s
Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) decided
in 2008 that it is not possible to patent
claims directed to products that, as
described in the application at the filing
date, could be prepared exclusively by
a method that involved the destruction
of an embryo, even where the method
was not part of the claim (Enlarged Board
of Appeal, 2008). However, the EPO
would not look behind the patent applica-
tion and would grant certain patents on
the basis that the initial material could
have been obtained from publicly avail-
able sources. We await further clarifica-
tion from the EPO as to how they will
interpret and apply the CJEU’s decision
in the Bru¨stle case.
As regards the specific patent filed by
Professor Bru¨stle, the CJEU referred
a basic question back to the German
court, namely whether hESCs obtained
from a human embryo at the blastocyst
stage of development are capable of
commencing the development of a human
being in light of scientific advances. It
seems clear from the CJEU’s ruling that
the Court believes (like the Advocate
General) that such hESCs will fall within
the definition of a human ‘‘embryo.’’ If
the German court agrees, as we believe
is likely, then inventions involving such
hESCs will not be patentable.REFERENCES
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